SEAL: Sealed Queries for Local Sanitization against Indirect Prompt Injection
Indirect prompt injection threatens local LLM agents through untrusted tool outputs, motivating defenses that suppress a
今日共收录 3279 条安全情报,包含 2996 个 CVE,94 篇安全通告,以及 100 篇研究论文。
← 返回归档列表Indirect prompt injection threatens local LLM agents through untrusted tool outputs, motivating defenses that suppress a
Large language models (LLMs) deployed in safety-critical settings must resist adversarial inputs designed to elicit harm
Cyber threat intelligence (CTI) reports describe adversary behavior in natural language, but converting them into struct
Large language model (LLM) agents have demonstrated strong capabilities in automating complex information-seeking and tr
Large language model (LLM) agents often receive access to more files, accounts, and services than a task requires. Promp
Large Language Model (LLM) agents are increasingly acting through Web interfaces and external tools. They produce trajec
Large language models (LLMs) have enabled more effective vulnerability scanning of web applications. However, these capa
Register-Transfer Level (RTL) simulators are fundamental to modern IC design workflows, yet like any complex software, t
The external sources retained in our non-systematic audit did not isolate the incremental security or utility effect of
LLM-based agents now share experiences on social platforms and remember new preferences to enhance their performance. Ho
Modern enterprises increasingly operate through complex information systems (IS) enabled by cloud computing, remote and
Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to visual jailbreak attacks that bypass safety safeguards. Exist
Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standards establish algorithms for quantum-safe systems, but empirical evidence about ho
An agent skill packages natural-language instructions, scripts, and reference files that an LLM-based agent loads for a
Software vulnerability detection remains difficult because existing approaches rely on predefined analysis rules, learn
Large language models are pretrained on vast, uncurated corpora scraped from the public web. This creates a security ris
Prior work framed the envelope layer as the channel through which malicious content enters an agent, and established it
Proprietary language models and their reasoning traces are vulnerable to API-based distillation, where an adversary trai
Agent skills, reusable instruction packages centred on a SKILL.md file, extend AI agents on demand, and a single line in
Audit-based certification bounds the violation rate of an LLM agent by auditing a random fraction $\varepsilon$ of actio