#cwe-340

共收录 7 条相关安全情报。

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Naxclow device identifiers use fixed manufacturing prefixes combined with sequential counters, producing a fully predictable and enumerable identifier space. Because the platform also exposes an endpoint that reveals the current identifier high-water mark, the active fleet can be enumerated.

💡 风险点: 原文内容(由于配额限制,未进行深度 LLM 分析)

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排序因子: 有可用补丁/修复方案 (+3) | Secondary 数据源 (+2) | 包含 CVE (+2) | LLM 评分加成 (+0.4)
CVE-2026-42932

Naxclow device identifiers use fixed manufacturing prefixes combined with sequential counters, producing a fully predictable and enumerable identifier space. Because the platform also exposes an endpoint that reveals the current identifier high-water mark, the active fleet can be enumerated.

💡 影响/原因: 原文内容(由于配额限制,未进行深度 LLM 分析)

🎯 建议动作: 建议根据原文自行评估

排序因子: Primary 数据源 (+3) | LLM 评分加成 (+0.4)
CVE-2026-45673

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, Netty's DNS resolver uses a predictable PRNG for generating DNS transaction IDs and defaults to a static UDP source port. This combination reduces the entropy of DNS queries, enabling DNS Cache Poisoning (Kaminsky attack). Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Fin

💡 影响/原因: 原文内容(由于配额限制,未进行深度 LLM 分析)

🎯 建议动作: 建议根据原文自行评估

排序因子: Primary 数据源 (+3) | LLM 评分加成 (+0.4)
io.netty:netty-resolver-dns

### Summary Netty's DNS resolver uses a predictable PRNG for generating DNS transaction IDs and defaults to a static UDP source port. This combination reduces the entropy of DNS queries, enabling DNS Cache Poisoning (Kaminsky attack). ### Details Two factors contribute to this vulnerability in io.netty.resolver.dns: - Predictable Query IDs: `DnsQueryIdSpace` manages 16-bit transaction IDs in buck

💡 风险点: 原文内容(由于配额限制,未进行深度 LLM 分析)

🎯 建议动作: 建议根据原文自行评估

排序因子: 有可用补丁/修复方案 (+3) | Secondary 数据源 (+2) | 包含 CVE (+2) | LLM 评分加成 (+0.4)
CVE-2026-8503

Apache::Session::Generate::SHA256 versions before 1.3.19 for Perl create insecure session ids. Apache::Session::Generate::SHA256 generated session ids insecurely. The default session id generator returns a SHA-256 hash of the built-in rand() function, the epoch time, and the PID, that is hashed again. These are predictable, low-entropy sources. Predicable session ids could allow an attacker to ga

💡 影响/原因: 原文内容(由于配额限制,未进行深度 LLM 分析)

🎯 建议动作: 建议根据原文自行评估

排序因子: Primary 数据源 (+3) | LLM 评分加成 (+0.4)
CVE-2026-5084

WebDyne::Session versions through 2.075 for Perl generates the session id insecurely. The session handler generates the session id from an MD5 hash seeded with a call to the built-in rand() function. The rand function is passed a maximum value based on the process id, the epoch time and the reference address of the object, but this information will have no effect on the overall quality of the see

💡 影响/原因: 原文内容(由于配额限制,未进行深度 LLM 分析)

🎯 建议动作: 建议根据原文自行评估

排序因子: Primary 数据源 (+3) | LLM 评分加成 (+0.4)
CVE-2026-5080

Dancer::Session::Abstract versions through 1.3522 for Perl generates session ids insecurely. The session id is generated from summing the character codepoints of the absolute pathname with the process id, the epoch time and calls to the built-in rand() function to return a number between 0 and 999-billion, and concatenating that result three times. The path name might be known or guessed by an a

💡 影响/原因: 原文内容(由于配额限制,未进行深度 LLM 分析)

🎯 建议动作: 建议根据原文自行评估

排序因子: Primary 数据源 (+3) | LLM 评分加成 (+0.4)