## Summary This advisory covers the deprecated `fabric-sdk-java` client SDK. `Channel.java` implements `readObject()` and exposes `deSerializeChannel()` which call `ObjectInputStream.readObject()` on untrusted byte arrays without configuring an `ObjectInputFilter`. This is the classic Java deserialization RCE pattern. **Note:** `fabric-sdk-java` is deprecated and maintained in https://github.com

Jenkins Matrix Authorization Strategy Plugin 2.0-beta-1 through 3.2.9 (both inclusive) invokes parameterless constructors of classes specified in configuration when deserializing inheritance strategies, without restricting the classes that can be instantiated, allowing attackers with Item/Configure permission to instantiate arbitrary types, which may lead to information disclosure or other impacts

A vulnerability was found in Grav CMS up to 1.7.49.5/2.0.0-beta.1. Affected by this vulnerability is the function FileCache::doGet of the file system/src/Grav/Framework/Cache/Adapter/FileCache.php of the component Cache Value Handler. The manipulation results in deserialization. The attack may be launched remotely. The attack requires a high level of complexity. The exploitation appears to be diff

The ConsulRegistry in the camel-consul component (class org.apache.camel.component.consul.ConsulRegistry and its inner ConsulRegistryUtils.deserialize method) read Java-serialized values from the Consul KV store and passed them to ObjectInputStream.readObject() without configuring an ObjectInputFilter. An attacker who can write to the Consul KV store backing a Camel ConsulRegistry instance could i

The fix for CVE-2024-52046 in Apache MINA AbstractIoBuffer.getObject() was incomplete. The classname allowlist of classes allowed to be deserialized was applied too late after a static initializer in a class to be read might already have been executed. Affected versions are Apache MINA 2.0.0 <= 2.0.27, 2.1.0 <= 2.1.10, and 2.2.0 <= 2.2.5. The problem is resolved in Apache MINA 2.0.28, 2.1.

The camel-infinispan component's ProtoStream-based remote aggregation repository deserializes data read from a remote Infinispan cache using java.io.ObjectInputStream without applying any ObjectInputFilter. An attacker who can write to the Infinispan cache used by a Camel application can inject a crafted serialized Java object that, when read during normal aggregation repository operations such as

The Camel-Mail component is vulnerable to Camel message header injection. The custom header filter strategy used by the component (MailHeaderFilterStrategy) only filters the 'out' direction via setOutFilterStartsWith, while it does not configure the 'in' direction via setInFilterStartsWith. As a result, when a Camel application consumes mail through camel-mail (for example via from(\"imap://...\")

Apache MINA's AbstractIoBuffer.resolveClass() contains two branches, one of them (for static classes or primitive types) does not check the class at all, bypassing the classname allowlist and allowing arbitrary code to be executed. The fix checks if the class is present in the accepted class filter before calling Class.forName().  Affected versions are Apache MINA 2.0.0 <= 2.0.27, 2.1.0

JmsBinding.extractBodyFromJms() in camel-jms, and the equivalent JmsBinding class in camel-sjms, deserialized the payload of incoming JMS ObjectMessage values via javax.jms.ObjectMessage.getObject() without applying any ObjectInputFilter, class allowlist or class denylist. Because this code path is reached whenever the mapJmsMessage option is enabled (the default) and Camel acts as a JMS consumer,

The camel-mina component's MinaConverter.toObjectInput(IoBuffer) type converter wraps an IoBuffer in a java.io.ObjectInputStream without applying any ObjectInputFilter or class-loading restrictions. When a Camel route uses camel-mina as a TCP or UDP consumer and requests conversion to ObjectInput (for example via getBody(ObjectInput.class) or @Body ObjectInput), an attacker sending a crafted seria

The Camel-PQC FileBasedKeyLifecycleManager class deserializes the contents of `.key` files in the configured key directory using java.io.ObjectInputStream without applying any ObjectInputFilter or class-loading restrictions. The cast to `java.security.KeyPair` is evaluated only after `readObject()` has already returned, so any `readObject()` side effects in the deserialized object run before the t