### Summary The `subtitlesHandler` endpoint (`GET /api/media/subtitles`) accepts two user-controlled query parameters: `path` and `name`, both of which are used in filesystem operations without sanitization, creating two independent path traversal vectors. The primary vector is the `path` parameter: it is passed directly to `idx.GetRealPath()` without calling `SanitizeUserPath()`, allowing an at

### Impact Remote denial of service via panic while parsing a crafted ECDHE_PSK ServerKeyExchange message. ### Patches Upgrade to v3.1.4 or later. This version includes this patch https://github.com/pion/dtls/pull/839 which fixes the issue. ### Workarounds No work around; please upgrade to v3.1.4 or a newer version.

### Impact Remote denial of service via panic while parsing a malformed XOR-MAPPED-ADDRESS attribute ### Patches Upgrade to v3.1.5 or later. This version includes this patch https://github.com/pion/stun/pull/278 which fixes the issue. ### Workarounds No work around; please upgrade to v3.1.5 or a newer version.

sigstore-go fails to check signature timestamps against a signing key's validity period for self-managed long-lived keys without certificates. ## Impact To verify a bundle with a self-managed long-lived key, the key needs to be wrapped in an `ExpiringKey` type that implies expiration semantics: ```go signatureVerifier, _ := signature.LoadDefaultVerifier(publicKey) expiredKey := root.NewExpiring

### Summary The free5GC AUSF (Authentication Server Function) does not validate the `supiOrSuci` field in UE authentication requests. Null bytes (`\x00`) and other control characters pass through JSON parsing unchanged and are forwarded to the UDM in an unescaped URL path. This causes Go's `net/url.Parse()` to fail, returning HTTP 500 "System failure" and leaking internal stack traces. An unauthe

## Summary The vault-secrets-webhook reads the `vault.security.banzaicloud.io/vault-addr` annotation from any ConfigMap or Secret being admitted and uses it as the Vault server address without any validation or allowlist. When a ConfigMap or Secret contains a value prefixed with `vault:`, the webhook's admission handler synchronously calls the Vault API at the attacker-supplied address from insid

### Summary CVE-2026-22872 (GHSA-qjjm-7j9w-pw72) reported that a Tenant Owner could create cluster-scoped resources (e.g. `ClusterRole`, `ValidatingWebhookConfiguration`) through a `TenantResource`, because the controller applies them with its cluster-admin ServiceAccount and `SetNamespace` is ineffective for cluster-scoped kinds. The v0.13.0 fix added a cluster-scope rejection guard, but **only o

### Summary `CapsuleConfiguration.Spec.NodeMetadata.ForbiddenLabels.Regex` and `ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex` are never validated by any admission webhook. A Cluster Admin can persist a malformed regex to etcd without being blocked. Once stored, every Node `CREATE`, `UPDATE`, or `PATCH` request triggers `regexp.MustCompile()` in `pkg/api/forbidden_list.go:36`, which **panics** and crashes the node

### Summary A maliciously crafted packet received & parsed during the SFTP connection handshake will cause a Go panic. ### Impact All wings users with an open SFTP port. ### Workarounds Close SFTP port.

### Impact **Type:** Exposure of sensitive information / insufficiently protected credentials leading to privilege escalation and full node compromise. Wings exposes its **entire** daemon configuration to the egg configuration-file templating engine. When Wings renders a server's configuration files, any `{{config.}}` placeholder in a replacement value is resolved against the full marshalled dae

### Summary Config file parsers, `json`, `yaml`, `xml` etc in parser.go have no file size limit/checks, allowing for a giant config file to potentially OOM the wings process. ### Impact All wings users who have an egg with a non-`file` parser configuration file setting.

### Summary `0.0.0.0` was used instead of NXDOMAIN for block responses. On Linux, which is the target platform for netfoil, the `0.0.0.0` is sent to localhost rather than just dropped. ### Impact Unintended traffic could be sent to localhost. Impact depends on running services and firewall rules.

### Summary The Fluentd configuration renderer in Logging operator writes strings from CRDs such as `Flow` directly into `fluent.conf` without escaping them. As a result, a user who can create `Flow` resources can inject Fluentd configuration by providing values that contain newlines. In the confirmed path, a value in `record_transformer.records` can close the current `` / `` block and add a new

### Summary A vulnerability in Zitadel's self-management capability allowed users to mark their email and phone as verified without going through an actual verification process. While [`GHSA-282g-fhmx-xf54`](https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/security/advisories/GHSA-282g-fhmx-xf54) (CVE-2026-27946, "Users Can Self-Verify Email/Phone via UpdateHumanUser API") closed the path that let any authent

### Impact Certain bidder adapters accept user-supplied parameters that are interpolated into outbound request URLs. Without proper input validation, a malicious actor could craft bid request parameters that cause the server to send HTTP requests to unintended destinations, potentially exposing internal network services or sensitive server endpoints to unauthorized access. ### Patches Patched in

## Summary `sendFile` derives the served filename from the raw request path while opening the file from the cleaned path, so appending a trailing slash empties the derived name and defeats both the never-serve rule for the ACL file and the block list. ## Finding (Medium): trailing-slash ACL and hidden-file bypass httpserver/handler.go, sendFile (lines 789-801) takes the filename from the RAW r

## Summary openhole-server forwarded the URL-decoded request path (`r.URL.Path`) to tunnel clients instead of the original request-target. Percent-encoded dot-segments (`%2e`) and separators (`%2f`) were decoded to `../` and `/` before reaching the local service. Go's ServeMux rejects literal `../` paths, but percent-encoded traversal sequences bypassed this and were delivered to backends as wor

### Impact A remote, unauthenticated attacker can cause excessive memory allocation (and resulting CPU / GC pressure, potentially OOM termination) by sending a crafted unencrypted MTProto packet. `(*proto.UnencryptedMessage).Decode` read an attacker-controlled 32-bit `dataLen` field and immediately allocated a buffer of that size via `make([]byte, dataLen)` **before** validating that the underly

## Summary The multipart upload filename fix splits on the path separator but never rejects dot-dot, allowing a write outside the served tree. ## Finding (Medium): upload filename escapes the served tree (residual of CVE-2026-35393) The multipart filename fix (updown.go lines 135-136) splits on the path separator but never rejects "..". Uploading with filename=".." results in os.Create against

## Summary The WebDAV mode-flag guard added to fix GHSA-3whc-qvhv-xqjp still does not enforce `--no-delete` on the WebDAV `MOVE` verb. `MOVE` deletes the source file (rename removes it from its original path), and with `Overwrite: T` it additionally performs an explicit `RemoveAll` on the destination. Under `-w --no-delete`, `DELETE` is correctly blocked (403) but `MOVE` still destroys existing f

GHSA-wvhv-qcqf-f3cx fixed the per-folder .goshs ACL bypass on the state-changing routes (PUT/POST upload/?mkdir/?delete) and added recursive ACL resolution, and its description states the read/list path correctly enforces .goshs. That premise does not hold for the ?bulk zip-download route. bulkDownload (httpserver/updown.go) takes one or more ?file= parameters, runs each through sanitizePath(fs.We

## Summary Start goshs v2.1.3 with `-b 'admin:' -sftp`. No `-fkf`. SFTP accepts connections without password. CVE-2026-40884 blocks the empty-username variant (`-b ':pass'`). The empty-password variant bypasses that fix. ## CVE-2026-40884 **CVE-2026-40884** (GHSA-c29w-qq4m-2gcv, Apr 13 2026) reported the empty-username case: `-b ':pass'` with `-sftp`. `sftpserver.go:85` uses `&&`: ```go if s.U

### Summary The Constellation-tunnel bypass branch in `tokenMiddleware` at `src/proxy/routerGen.go:53-66` returns to the upstream handler before the request's `x-cosmos-user`, `x-cosmos-role`, `x-cosmos-user-role`, and `x-cosmos-mfa` headers are stripped at lines 68-72, and before the `AdminOnlyWithRedirect` gate at lines 109-117 runs. Any holder of a valid Constellation device API key sends `x-c

### Summary `GET /cosmos/api/constellation/public-devices` discloses Constellation device metadata to a requester that supplies any non-empty `Authorization` header. The handler strips the string `Bearer ` from the header but never validates the resulting token and never uses it in the database query. This was confirmed locally by routing a request through the real `tokenMiddleware` with `Authori

`SanitizeFilePath` in `pkg/utils/utils.go` validated that a path stayed under a safe directory by calling `strings.HasPrefix(path, safedir)`. This is a lexical check, not a directory boundary check: `/packages-extra/evil` starts with `/packages`, so it passed. The function did not enforce a path-separator boundary, so any sibling directory whose name began with the safe-directory string was accept

`Unarchive` in `pkg/utils/zip.go` joined each archive entry name with the destination directory via `filepath.Join` and wrote the result without checking whether the resolved path stayed under the destination. A zip entry named `../../tmp/evil` therefore landed at `/tmp/evil`. An attacker who could control a `Package.Spec.Source.URL` or `Deployment.URL` archive could induce the fetcher (running

`HTTPTriggerSpec.Validate()` validated `Methods`, `FunctionReference`, `Host`, `IngressConfig`, and `CorsConfig`, but silently skipped `RelativeURL` and `Prefix`. Those two fields were validated at the CLI level only (`pkg/fission-cli/cmd/httptrigger/create.go:83`). The post-CRD-modernization webhook for HTTPTrigger was retired in favor of API-server CEL — and CEL had no rules on those fields eith

Fission v1.24.0 added PodSpec safety validation for tenant-facing Environment and Function CRDs (`ValidatePodSpecSafety` / `ValidateContainerSafety` admission webhook + `sanitizeContainerSecurityContext` executor merge layer), but the capability check was implemented as a fixed **denylist of six Linux capabilities** (SYS_ADMIN, NET_ADMIN, SYS_PTRACE, SYS_MODULE, DAC_READ_SEARCH, DAC_OVERRIDE). The

### Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_ A network attacker who can reach an etcd TLS listener can open many TCP connections and never send a ClientHello. Each connection spawns a goroutine in the etcd server process that blocks indefinitely inside tls.Conn.Handshake(), and each is tracked in the pending map. Unbounded goroutine and map growth exhausts memory in the etcd pr

| Field | Value | |---|---| | Ecosystem | Go | | Package | `github.com/getkin/kin-openapi` | | Affected versions | `<= 0.143.0` (introduced in `v0.2.0`, PR #90, 2019-05-07; reproduced on `HEAD` `30e2923`) | | Patched versions | 0.144.0 | --- ### Summary `openapi3filter.ValidateRequest` contains a NULL-pointer-dereference denial of service: any **unauthenticated** client can crash the request-val

### Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_ A user granted READ permission on a single, exact key can use the Watch gRPC API with `clientv3.WithFromKey()` (an open-ended, "from this key to the end of the keyspace" watch) to receive watch events for every key lexicographically greater than or equal to their permitted key — not just the one key they were granted. This is an au

### Summary Oh My Posh re-renders the resolved path string, which contains the raw folder names taken from the filesystem, through the Go `text/template` engine. That engine's function map exposes a `cmd` function that runs arbitrary OS commands. A directory whose name contains a Go template expression is therefore evaluated when the prompt renders, giving arbitrary command execution as the curren

### Summary Oh My Posh renders dynamic, potentially attacker-controlled strings (the current directory name, Git commit metadata, environment variable values, command output) into the prompt without neutralizing raw terminal control characters. An attacker who controls one of these values can inject ANSI/OSC escape sequences that the victim's terminal executes on every prompt render. (This is sepa

### Summary An authorization bypass vulnerability exists in the file sharing mechanism of `Openlist`. Due to a flawed, non-separator-aware path validation check, an authenticated user can create share links for files outside their restricted base directory. This allows an attacker to bypass tenant/user isolation and gain unauthorized read access to arbitrary files within the system. ### Details W

### Summary An authorization bypass and information disclosure vulnerability exists in the search API of `Openlist`. Due to a non-separator-aware path check and unfiltered backend counting, a low-privileged user can bypass their assigned `BasePath` restrictions to discover and access metadata of files residing in unauthorized sibling directories. ### Details This vulnerability stems from two comb

### Summary The `/api/fs/batch_rename` handler validates and authorizes only the requested source directory. It rejects path separators in `new_name`, but it does not validate `src_name`. The handler concatenates `src_dir` and attacker-controlled `src_name`, then passes the result to the filesystem rename layer, where the path is normalized. An authenticated user with rename permission can set `

## Summary Cloudreve exposes two admin node test endpoints under the `Admin.Read` OAuth scope. These endpoints accept attacker-controlled node definitions and cause Cloudreve to make outbound server-side network requests. This allows an OAuth client authorized only for `Admin.Read` to trigger operational network actions that should require `Admin.Write`. ## Impact An attacker who obtains an adm

## Summary An integer-overflow vulnerability in the frp server's optional SSH Tunnel Gateway lets any unauthenticated remote attacker crash the entire `frps` process with a single five-byte message. When the gateway parses an SSH `exec` channel request in `pkg/ssh/server.go`, it adds a small constant to a four-byte length value taken directly from the request. Because that length is fully attacke

## Summary Kite versions 0.6.9 through 0.14.0 authorize Kubernetes proxy requests against the pod or service identified by the original route parameters. Encoded path traversal segments can cause the upstream URL to resolve to a different Kubernetes API endpoint after authorization. ## Impact An authenticated user with `get` permission on pods or services in one namespace can cause Kite to issu

## Summary Cloudreve WOPI access tokens are generated as `.`, but the WOPI middleware validates only the session id prefix and never compares the supplied token to the stored token. In addition, a WOPI viewer session does not store or enforce the requested viewer action. A session created for a view or preview action can still call WOPI write routes if the underlying file is writable by the sessi

## Summary An attacker can cause excessive memory allocation in webtransport-go by sending an unknown WebTransport capsule with a large payload. The implementation skips unknown capsules by reading the entire capsule body into memory, instead of draining it without retaining the data. This can lead to memory exhaustion. ## Impact A misbehaving or malicious peer can cause a denial-of-service (Do

## Summary Cloudreve 4.16.1 has an OAuth scope authorization bypass in the admin storage policy routes. An OAuth bearer token scoped to `Admin.Read` but not `Admin.Write` can call `POST /api/v4/admin/policy/oauth/signin` and update OneDrive storage policy credentials. The route is inside the admin group that requires `Admin.Read`, but it does not add the local `Admin.Write` guard used by sibling

## Summary When an authenticated recipient of a **single-file** share opens the file event stream (`GET /api/v4/file/events?uri=`), Cloudreve validates the URI by listing it and then subscribes the caller to `parent.ID()`. For a single-file share, the share navigator resolves the bare share-root URI to the **owner-side parent folder** of the shared file (not the file), while the visible listing

## Summary Cloudreve's built-in image processor decodes user-supplied images with Go's standard-library decoders (`image/png`, `image/jpeg`, `image/gif`) and guards **only the compressed file size** — never the *decoded* pixel dimensions. Go's decoders allocate a pixel buffer sized `bytesPerPixel × width × height` taken straight from the image header (e.g. a PNG's IHDR), with no upper bound on `w

## Summary `GET /api/v4/user/search` is available to any logged-in user. The service calls `userClient.SearchActive`, but despite its name that method filters only by email/nickname keyword and **never adds a `StatusActive` predicate** — while the sibling lookups `GetActiveByID` and `GetActiveByDavAccount`, defined a few lines above it, do. Search hits are serialized at `RedactLevelUser`, which

## Summary Cloudreve's WOPI `PUT_RELATIVE` handler treats `X-WOPI-SuggestedTarget` as a path, not a filename. It splits the header on `/` and joins the segments onto the source file's directory with `URI.JoinRaw`, which feeds Go's `url.JoinPath`. `url.JoinPath` resolves `.`/`..` segments, so a slash-bearing target such as `a/../../evil.docx` collapses to a location outside the source file's dire

Multiple security vulnerabilities have been identified and addressed in grpc-go affecting the xDS RBAC authorization engine (internal/xds/rbac) and the HTTP/2 transport server implementation (internal/transport). These vulnerabilities could result in: - Authorization Bypass (Fail-Open) when translating xDS RBAC policies containing `Metadata` or `RequestedServerName` fields. - Denial of Service (H

### Summary I'm reporting **two related TOTP one-time-use defects** in Gitea that survive the CVE-2021-45331 fix. The 2018 fix (PR #3878) introduced the `TwoFactor.LastUsedPasscode` field and added an in-memory inequality check on the web 2FA login path. That check works correctly in the single-request case, but it leaves two follow-up gaps: 1. **A TOCTOU race on the web surfaces (Defect 1).** T

### Summary A personal access token restricted with the public-only scope can still retrieve private organization membership and organization permission details for its own account through organization-listing endpoints. This bypass breaks the intended guarantee that such tokens are limited to public resources only. ### Details The issue affects the following endpoints: GET /api/v1/user/orgs GET

### Summary Gitea has robust SSRF protection via `hostmatcher.NewDialContext()` for webhook and migration clone URLs, which validates resolved IPs at the TCP dial level. However, three code paths use raw `http.Get()` (Go's `DefaultClient`) which completely bypasses this protection, enabling SSRF to internal services and local file read via the `file://` scheme. ### Vulnerable Code **File: `modu

## Summary The `ToHook()` function in `services/webhook/general.go` decrypts the webhook's `HeaderAuthorizationEncrypted` field and returns the plaintext authorization header in the API response. Any repository admin can read the full plaintext value of webhook authorization headers (Bearer tokens, Basic auth credentials, API keys) set by other admins. The authorization header is stored encrypte

**Author:** Prakhar Porwal **Date:** 2026-05-24 **Target:** Gitea (self-hosted Git service) **Branch tested:** `main` @ `b7e95cc48c` (development build, go1.26.3) **Component:** `routers/api/v1/org/action.go` (org-level Actions API) **OWASP:** API3:2023 Broken Object Property Level Authorization --- ## 1. Summary The org-level Actions REST endpoints ``` GET /api/v1/orgs/{org}/actions/runs GET

## Summary GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp ("Gitea may send release notification emails for private repositories to users whose access has been revoked", fix in PR #36319 / commit 8a98ac22) added `repo_model.ClearRepoWatches` as a defense for the state transition public→private. The cleanup was wired into `services/repository/repository.go::MakeRepoPrivate` only. The sister helper `services/repository/reposi

### Summary Gitea's `/api/v1/teams/{id}` API routes do not correctly enforce the `public-only` access token restriction. A `public-only` token is intended to limit API access to public repositories and public organizations. However, several team API routes continue to return private team repository metadata and private team activity feed entries when called with a `public-only` token. ### Detai

## Summary PR #38145 fixed ListPublicMembers and IsPublicMember but missed ListMembers. Any authenticated user can enumerate ALL members (not just public ones) of a private organization. ## Affected Versions <= v1.26.4 (latest) and main branch ## Root Cause routers/api/v1/org/member.go — ListMembers(): // Missing check: if !organization.HasOrgOrUserVisible(ctx, ctx.Org.Organization.AsUse

### Summary The OAuth2 sign-in callback in Gitea 1.26.1 unconditionally re-enables a locally-disabled account whenever the user authenticates through a linked external identity provider, silently undoing any administrator-initiated `Disable Account` action and issuing a fresh authenticated session in the same response. Once a user has linked any external IdP, the administrator's disable toggle be

# Summary An information disclosure issue in the Gitea Notification API allows users who have lost access to a private repository to continue accessing private issue or pull request information through existing notification threads. Although repository information is hidden after access revocation, the `subject` field remains accessible and continues to expose private metadata. # Details CVE-20

## Summary Gitea 1.26.2 does not properly enforce organization visibility restrictions on organization label read endpoints. A user without access to a private organization can retrieve labels belonging to that organization through the Organization Labels API. As a result, label metadata intended to be restricted to organization members may be disclosed. The issue is limited to unauthorized rea

## Vulnerability Header | Field | Value | | ------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Vulnerability Title | Cached Per-Branch Permission Check in Pre-Receive Hook Allows Full Repository Write | | Severity Rating | High

### Summary The `POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/merge-upstream` endpoint continues to synchronize commits from a parent repository after the parent repository has been changed from public to private. A fork created while the parent repository was public can still receive commits made after the parent repository becomes private. As a result, content added during the private period becomes avai

| --- | --- | | Versions tested | `gitea/gitea:1.26.2` (digest `sha256:7d13848af12645600a5f9d93ee2560daa9c6fa6b5b859b7bff3a5e1c0b661031`); `gitea/gitea:latest` resolves to the same digest at time of writing | | Source review | `git checkout v1.26.2` (commit `2c749ce`) | | Reproduction | `bash run_poc.sh` (single shot: brings up containers, runs three PoCs, prints captured evidence, tears down on e

### Summary The Locale middleware that runs in front of every unauthenticated request calls `golang.org/x/text/language.ParseAcceptLanguage` on the raw `Accept-Language` header without imposing a size or shape filter. The underlying parser has quadratic-time behaviour on long lists of malformed language tags. The CVE-2022-32149 guard that golang.org/x/text added in v0.3.8 caps the number of `-` c

Gitea's SSH key ingestion endpoint accepts keys in RFC 4716 (SSH2) format and normalises them before storage. The normalisation function contains an O(N²) string concatenation loop with no input size limit, meaning a single malicious key submission can force the server to perform an amount of work that grows quadratically with the size of the input. Any authenticated user can exploit this to exhau

### Repository Visibility Manipulation via Git Push Options | Field | Value | |-------|-------| | **Affected File** | `routers/private/hook_post_receive.go` | | **Affected Function** | `HookPostReceive()` | | **Affected Lines** | 173–225 | | **Prerequisite** | Attacker must have owner-level or admin collaborator access to the target repository | --- #### Description Gitea's post-receive git ho

## Description Gitea's OAuth2 sign-in callback reactivates a deactivated user account (`IsActive=false`) when the user signs in through an authentication source that does not issue refresh tokens (notably GitHub, and any OIDC/OAuth2 source configured without `offline_access`). PR #38009 added a gate intended to reactivate users only when the OAuth2 auto-sync cron had disabled them, using "the sto

## Summary FileBrowser confines each user to a *scope*: a home directory that acts as the boundary for everything they can read or write. When self-registration and automatic home-directory creation are both enabled (`Signup=true` and `CreateUserDir=true`), a new user's scope is built from their username after it passes through `cleanUsername()`. That function rewrites the name: it strips `..` an

## Summary When a user creates a password-protected share or lists existing shares, the JSON response includes the full bcrypt `password_hash` and the secret `token` of the share. The `Link` storage struct is serialized directly with `json.Marshal` and tags `password_hash` and `token` for output, with no field filtering. Any authenticated user receives these secrets for their own shares, and an a

## Summary The fix for `GHSA-gxjx-7m74-hcq8` / `CVE-2026-54093` (shipped in v2.63.6) added a `strings.ReplaceAll(nameInArchive, "\\", "/")` step to the archive builder; this was the advisory's recommended "Primary Fix." On a Linux host a backslash is a legal, non-separator filename character, so replacing it with the real POSIX separator `/` **manufactures** a `/`-delimited traversal sequence out

### Summary A wrong policy can be an open door. You have to check `input.attributes.request.http.truncated_body` in your policy. ### Description Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-50197: an oversized declared-`Content-Length` body still hands OPA an empty `parsed_body`, so deny-on-presence Rego policies fail OPEN while the full payload reaches upstream. The CVE-2026-50197 fix (commit `3152f3b0`, PR

## Description The `routesrv` component exposes the full cluster route topology (Ingress/RouteGroup configurations, backend URLs, filter chains, OAuth/OIDC callback paths) and cache-cluster topology (Redis/Valkey shard addresses) over plain HTTP with **zero authentication**. Any pod in the Kubernetes cluster can reach routesrv via its predictable DNS name and retrieve sensitive cluster-wide routi

### CVE Description Gitea versions up to and including 1.26.1 have insufficient permission checks for Composer package source links, which can expose private or internal package source information. ### Summary A critical vulnerability has been discovered in Gitea. It was already reported via (security@gitea.io) from (dev@noscope.com), and submitted an encrypted report.

## Summary The vulnerability in oapi-codegen seems to be similar with CVE-2026-22785, which is a generated-code injection issue where untrusted OpenAPI `summary` text is embedded into generated TypeScript MCP server source without proper escaping. `oapi-codegen` has a similar vulnerability in its server URL generator: untrusted OpenAPI `servers[].description` text is inserted into a generated Go

## Summary The Kubernetes admission webhook handler reads the entire request body using `io.ReadAll(r.Body)` without any size limit. Any client that can reach the webhook port within the cluster can send a multi-GB payload, causing the skipper process to exhaust memory and be OOM-killed. This disrupts all Kubernetes admission control, potentially blocking all pod creation and updates. ## Vulnera

When kuma-dp is started against an HTTPS control plane and the operator did not pass a CA certificate, the data plane connects with TLS peer verification disabled. The dataplane authentication token is sent over this unverified connection ## Impact An on-path attacker can intercept the dataplane authentication token and impersonate the control plane to the data plane, allowing them to inject a f

## Summary Nuclio Dashboard exposes `POST /api/functions` without authentication by default (NOP auth mode). The `spec.handler` field (e.g., `mymodule:myfunction`) is parsed by `functionconfig.ParseHandler()` which splits on `:` only — no path validation is applied to the module portion. During function build, `writeFunctionSourceCodeToTempFile()` passes the module name directly to `path.Join(te

## Summary Nuclio's Java runtime generates a `build.gradle` file during function builds using Go's `text/template` package. The template renders `runtimeAttributes.repositories[]` values with the `{{ . }}` action, which performs no escaping. An attacker can embed a closing brace (`}`) to break out of the `repositories {}` block and append arbitrary Groovy statements that execute unconditionally d

### Impact When Envoy Gateway runs in GatewayNamespaceMode (`provider.kubernetes.deploy.type=GatewayNamespace`), the xDS gRPC server is configured with a `StreamInterceptor` for JWT authentication but no UnaryInterceptor. The go-control-plane xDS server exposes both streaming and unary (Fetch) RPC methods for all registered discovery services. Since there is no unary interceptor, these Fetch endpo

### Impact The `to_absolute_normalized_path` function (security.lua:28-43) does not collapse redundant path separators (// → /). On Linux, `//etc/passwd` is equivalent to `/etc/passwd` (POSIX path semantics), but `is_critical_path` fails to match the double-slash variant because `//etc/passwd` does not start with `/etc/`. This allows Lua code submitted as an `EnvoyExtensionPolicy` to read arbitr

Vulnerability report without repro case. Repro case may be added later after harness is complete. **Preconditions (4):** - Pod-network reachability to :18002 (no auth) - Tenant can create EnvoyExtensionPolicy (baseline) - Attacker pod floods GET while churning EnvoyExtensionPolicy with distinct Wasm URLs - Read at :153 must overlap a write at :201/:209 (probabilistic, attacker controls both rates

Vulnerability report without repro case. Repro case may be added later after harness is complete. **Preconditions (4):** - Tenant can create EnvoyExtensionPolicy (baseline) - Controller has egress to attacker-controlled OCI registry - No registry allowlist (none exists in code) - Layer presents Docker/OCI media type **Description** At imagefetcher.go:287, make([]byte, h.Size) uses the attacker-

Vulnerability report without repro case. Repro case may be added later after harness is complete. **Preconditions (4):** - Tenant has SecurityPolicy + TCPRoute RBAC (baseline) - Tenant namespace permitted to attach TCPRoute to a Gateway listener - spec.authorization omitted (the trigger) - No admission webhook blocks the shape **Description:** A namespace-scoped tenant can deterministically pan

Vulnerability report without repro case. Repro case may be added later after harness is complete. **Preconditions (4):** - Tenant can create EnvoyExtensionPolicy (baseline) - Attacker hosts a gzip-bomb at a reachable URL - sha256 unset (optional field; check is post-decompression anyway) - No operator Wasm-URL allowlist (none exists in code) **Description** getFileFromGZ calls io.ReadAll on a r

### Impact Envoy Gateway accepts extension-managed custom backendRefs from an HTTPRoute to a backend resource in another namespace without requiring a matching Gateway API ReferenceGrant in the target namespace. This breaks the Gateway API cross-namespace consent model: the namespace that owns the referenced backend resource does not need to opt in with a ReferenceGrant before another namespace’s

When an operator adds an HTTPS control plane profile to `kumactl` without providing a CA certificate, `kumactl` disables TLS verification and sends API tokens over the unverified connection ## Impact An attacker on the network path between the operator and the control plane can intercept user or admin API tokens and then act against the control plane as that user ## Affected configurations - `

# Security Advisory: SSRF in remote MCP server authentication discovery **Severity:** High. **CWE:** CWE-918. **Affected:** ToolHive through the latest release v0.29.3 and current `main` (HEAD b672d82f, 2026-06-12; re-verified 2026-06-14). `FetchResourceMetadata` and the discovery clients remain unguarded; no commits to `pkg/auth/discovery` or `pkg/auth/remote` address this. Originally identified

## Summary The HPKE V2 URL decode path in `pkg/hpke/url.go` decompresses attacker-controlled zstd data without any size limit. On Pomerium deployments using the stateless authentication flow (Pomerium Zero / hosted authenticate), the proxy's `/.pomerium/callback` endpoint is reachable without credentials and processes attacker-crafted HPKE-encrypted payloads before the sender's identity is valida

### Impact Datadog tracing libraries that implement W3C baggage propagation parse incoming baggage HTTP headers without enforcing item-count or byte-size limits on the extract path. The DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_ITEMS (default 64) and DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_BYTES (default 8192) limits were applied only to baggage injection, not extraction. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can send a request whose bagga

## Summary A namespaced `FeatureFlagSource` or `InProcessConfiguration` resource can be referenced cross-namespace via the `openfeature.dev/featureflagsource` annotation using the documented `{NAMESPACE}/{NAME}` syntax. The operator resolves the referenced resource cluster-wide and materializes its contents (env vars, flagd sidecar arguments including `httpSyncBearerToken`, sync URIs, supporting

The `privateNetworks` blocklist was found to be missing newly added CIDR ranges. More specifically, the following CIDR ranges were not being blocked: - `64:ff9b:1::/48`: NAT64 local-use prefix (RFC 8215) - `5f00::/16`: Segment Routing (SRv6) SIDs (RFC 9602) - `3fff::/20`: documentation prefix (RFC 9637) - `100:0:0:1::/64`: Dummy IPv6 Prefix (RFC 9780) ### Impact If exploited, an attacker would po

## Summary ToolHive's hand-rolled private/reserved-IP SSRF guard (`networking.IsPrivateIP` in `pkg/networking/utilities.go`) does not recognize the IPv6 **NAT64** address ranges — the well-known prefix `64:ff9b::/96` (RFC 6052) and the RFC 8215 local-use prefix `64:ff9b:1::/48`. As a result, an address such as `64:ff9b:1::a9fe:a9fe` — the NAT64 encoding of the link-local cloud metadata address `1

### Impact A privilege escalation vulnerability affects Woodpecker instances using the **Kubernetes backend**. The pipeline option `backend_options.kubernetes.serviceAccountName` was passed directly to the pod spec without any admin gating. **Who is impacted:** any operator running the Kubernetes backend. Any user with **Push** permission on a connected repository can run pipeline pods under an

### Summary Non-admin operators (role `user`) can set `allow_private: true` on their own managed webhook subscription (`POST`/`PATCH /api/v1/webhook-subscriptions`). No admin check exists on this field. At delivery time, `allow_private` switches the dispatcher to an unguarded HTTP client, bypassing the private/loopback/link-local SSRF guard — letting a low-privilege operator make the server reque

### Summary nebula-mesh revokes a host by adding its certificate fingerprint to a per-CA blocklist and shipping that list to every other agent on each poll. Slack's Nebula enforces certificate revocation ONLY through the `pki.blocklist` list in `config.yml` (no CRL/OCSP). The project's own code states this: `internal/pki/durations.go:15` — "Revocation via the blocklist remains the immediate secur

### Summary The `nebula-mgmt` Web UI host-creation path ignores both the server-wide `enrollment_token_ttl` security setting and per-network `network_config.enrollment_token_ttl` overrides. API host creation and token-regeneration paths use the configured TTL resolver, but `POST /ui/hosts` hardcodes `now.Add(24 * time.Hour)` for newly minted agent enrollment tokens. In deployments that intentional

### Summary When OIDC is enabled, `GET /ui/oidc/login` is reachable without authentication and is registered outside the Web UI rate-limited auth routes. Every request creates a fresh random OIDC state value and stores it in an in-memory map for `10m`. Expired states are swept lazily, but there is no rate limit or maximum live-state cap on the allocation path. An unauthenticated remote client can

## Summary Anyquery's `server` mode lacks input sanitization and access control over its built-in SQLite virtual table modules (e.g., `csv_reader`, `log_reader`). Unauthenticated attackers connecting to the MySQL-compatible server port can create virtual tables pointing to local files on the system (e.g., `/etc/passwd`, `~/.ssh/id_rsa`). This allows full Local File Read (LFR) capabilities, comprom

## Impact Operator session tokens are stored in plaintext in the `operator_sessions` table (the `token` column is the PRIMARY KEY). The session token is a 32-byte random hex value sent directly in a cookie and valid for 24 hours. - `internal/models/operator.go:61` — `OperatorSession.Token` holds the plaintext token. - `internal/store/sqlite_operators.go:590` — `CreateOperatorSession` inserts `se

## Impact The web handler `renderMobileBundle` (`internal/web/handlers.go:1325`) passes the real `*pki.CAResolver` directly into `mobilebundle.Build`. Inside `Build` (`internal/mobilebundle/builder.go:54`), `resolver.LoadByID` decrypts the CA's ed25519 private key into a `*pki.CAManager`, but `Build` never calls `CAManager.Wipe()` on any return path (success or any of the error paths at lines 56,

## Summary Anyquery's `server` mode does not restrict outbound HTTP requests initiated by its built-in SQLite virtual table modules (e.g., `json_reader`, `log_reader`). Unauthenticated attackers connecting to the MySQL-compatible server port can create virtual tables pointing to internal network endpoints or Cloud Metadata IPs (e.g., `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/`). This allows attacke

### Summary Ech0's i18n middleware runs on every HTTP request and constructs a fresh `*goi18n.Localizer` from the raw `Accept-Language` header without imposing any size or shape filter. `goi18n.NewLocalizer` calls `golang.org/x/text/language.ParseAcceptLanguage` on the value internally. The underlying parser has quadratic-time behaviour on long lists of malformed language tags. The CVE-2022-32149

## Summary When Trivy scans a Helm chart archive (`.tgz`), its custom tar unpacker reads each entry with `io.ReadAll(tr)` and no size limit. An attacker who can place a malicious `.tgz` file in the scanned path can craft a small compressed archive that decompresses to gigabytes, causing the Trivy process to be killed by the OS OOM killer. ## Affected configurations Exploitation requires the att

## Description The HTTP reverse proxy handler in tsdproxy does not strip the X-Forwarded-For (or X-Real-IP) header from incoming requests before calling r.SetXForwarded(). This allows an authenticated Tailscale user to inject arbitrary X-Forwarded-For values that are forwarded verbatim to backend services. ```go // internal/proxymanager/port.go -- Rewrite function Rewrite: func(r *httputil.Proxy

## Arbitrary File Write via MCP `caption-download` Tool ### Summary The `caption-download` MCP tool in yutu passes the caller-supplied `file` parameter directly to `os.Create()` at `pkg/caption/caption.go:272` without any path validation, canonicalization, or confinement to the `pkg.Root` boundary (`YUTU_ROOT`). A local attacker — or any process able to reach the HTTP MCP server — can write arbi

### Impact A vulnerability in Woodpecker CI's gRPC layer allowed any authenticated agent to impersonate any other agent on the same server by injecting a forged `agent_id` value into outgoing gRPC metadata. The server correctly verified the JWT token but then discarded the verified agent identity in favor of the client-supplied value. ### Patches Direct patch: https://github.com/woodpecker-ci/woo

## Summary Anyquery's `server` mode does not disable or restrict native SQLite disk manipulation commands. Unauthenticated attackers connecting to the MySQL-compatible server port can use the `ATTACH DATABASE` command to write arbitrary SQLite databases to any path on the victim's filesystem where the process has write permissions. This leads to Arbitrary File Write (AFW) which could lead to Remot

## Unbounded Pod Log Read via Attacker-Controlled `limitBytes`/`tailLines` Causes Memory Exhaustion ### Summary The MKP (Model Context Protocol for Kubernetes) server exposes a `get_resource` MCP tool that proxies Kubernetes pod log requests. User-supplied `limitBytes` and `tailLines` parameters are parsed as unbounded `int64` values and forwarded directly to the Kubernetes API. The server then

### Summary: Remote post-serve actions use `http.DefaultClient` without any timeout configuration. When the remote endpoint is unreachable or intentionally slow (accepts TCP connection but never responds), each triggered proxy request spawns a goroutine that blocks indefinitely on `http.DefaultClient.Do()`. An attacker can cause unbounded goroutine accumulation leading to memory exhaustion and pr

### Summary: When Hoverfly is running in Diff mode, the `AddDiff()` function writes to the shared `responsesDiff` map without any synchronization (no mutex). When multiple proxy requests are processed concurrently (the normal case for any proxy), the concurrent map writes trigger Go's built-in race detector which causes a `fatal error: concurrent map read and map write`, immediately killing the e

#### Summary A path traversal vulnerability exists in K3s's etcd snapshot decompression functionality. Zip files containing archive members with maliciously crafted names (e.g., `../../../../etc/password`) can be written to arbitrary locations on the filesystem when an administrator restores the archive as a compressed etcd snapshot. #### Mitigations * Enable golang's built-in [insecure path pr

## Description A vulnerability was discovered in TSDProxy where it forwards its internal per-process authentication token to all proxied backend services. When `identityHeaders` is enabled (the default), tsdproxy injects `x-tsdproxy-auth-token` into every upstream HTTP request alongside user identity headers. This token is the same secret used by the management HTTP server to trust forwarded Tail

Previously, Apko verified the control section hash (`.PKGINFO` etc.) against the signed `APKINDEX`, but never verified the data section hash (the actual package files that get installed). An attacker who could compromise a mirror, poison a cache, or MITM a package fetch could substitute arbitrary file contents while the control hash check still passed.

SiYuan v3.6.5 and earlier versions contain a stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Attribute View (database) asset cell renderer that escalates to remote code execution (RCE) in the Electron desktop client. This is a neighbor-bug of CVE-2026-44588: the fix for -44588 used `escapeAriaLabel()` (double-escapes `${item.name || item.content}`; The `>${item.name || item.content}` por

### Summary The attribute-view (database) cell renderer `genAVValueHTML` interpolates cell content raw in four of its branches: `text`, `url`, `phone`, and `mAsset`. A cell value like `` or `">` breaks out of its surrounding tag and runs arbitrary JavaScript in the renderer when the victim opens the block-attribute panel. On Electron desktop the renderer runs with `nodeIntegration:true`, so the X

## Overview The Hook Authentication feature in File Browser allows administrators to delegate login verification to an external shell command. User-supplied credentials (username and password) are interpolated into this command string using `os.Expand` without sanitization. An **unauthenticated remote attacker** can inject shell metacharacters in the username or password field at the login screen

## Summary `renderPackageREADME` in `kernel/bazaar/readme.go` renders a Bazaar package README from Markdown to HTML with the lute engine and `SetSanitize(true)`. The lute sanitizer is an event-handler blocklist: `allowAttr` rejects only attribute names present in a fixed `eventAttrs` map copied from the w3schools legacy handler list. That map omits modern event handlers. `onpointerover`, `onpoin

## Summary When FileBrowser is configured with proxy authentication (`auth.method=proxy`), any unauthenticated attacker who can reach the server directly can impersonate **any user - including admin** - by sending a single forged HTTP header. No credentials are required. Additionally, specifying a non-existent username causes the server to **automatically create a new user account**, providing an

## Summary SiYuan Note's kernel HTTP server unconditionally trusts all `chrome-extension://` origins, granting `RoleAdministrator` access to every installed browser extension without any authentication. Combined with the default empty `AccessAuthCode` on desktop installs, any Chrome/Chromium extension -- including a compromised legitimate extension via supply chain attack -- can make fully authen

### Summary The `/api/icon/getDynamicIcon` endpoint is explicitly excluded from authentication in SiYuan's kernel router (`router.go`, "不需要鉴权" -- no auth needed). When called with `type=8` and a valid block `id` parameter, this endpoint invokes `RenderDynamicIconContentTemplate`, which executes a Go template that includes the `querySQL` and `queryBlocks` functions. These functions run arbitrary S

## Unbounded Row Index Allocation in Worksheet Parser (checkSheet OOM/Panic DoS) ### Summary The `checkSheet()` function in `github.com/xuri/excelize/v2` uses an attacker-controlled `` XML attribute value directly as the length argument to `make([]xlsxRow, row)` without validating it against the Excel row limit (`TotalRows = 1,048,576`). A specially crafted XLSX file can trigger two denial-of-ser

## Summary The `/authorize` endpoint accepts any `redirect_uri` without validating it against `AllowedOrigins`. When `response_type=token` or `response_type=id_token`, the server appends `access_token`, `id_token`, and `refresh_token` as query parameters and issues a 302 redirect to the attacker-supplied URL. An unauthenticated attacker can obtain the required `client_id` from the public `/graphq

### Summary A CSS snippet body containing `` breaks out of its surrounding `` tag when `renderSnippet()` interpolates it via `insertAdjacentHTML`. A payload like `` runs arbitrary JavaScript in the renderer. On Electron desktop builds the renderer runs with `nodeIntegration:true`, so `require('child_process')` is reachable from the injected handler and the XSS chains to host RCE. Snippets sync vi

## Summary The patch for CVE-2026-41894 ("Path Traversal via Double URL Encoding") sanitized the `/export/` route but the **identical root cause remains in the `/assets/*path` route**. In publish mode (anonymous read-only HTTP endpoint, default port 6808), an unauthenticated remote attacker can read arbitrary files inside `WorkspaceDir` — including `conf/conf.json` (which contains the `Acc

Found through variant analysis based on `CVE-2026-41643` ## Summary GoBGP accepts a zero-length AS_PATH during UPDATE decoding and later panics while validating that attribute for a confederation eBGP peer. The vulnerable path is in the BGP UPDATE validator: a malformed UPDATE that should be rejected as a malformed AS_PATH instead reaches an unchecked `p.Value[0]` access, allowing a configured co

### Summary GoBGP contains a BGP OPEN capability parsing issue where several concrete capability decoders may parse data from the full remaining capability buffer instead of the slice bounded by the declared capability length, `CapLen`. A malformed BGP OPEN message can cause bytes from a following capability to be interpreted as part of the current capability. The most security-relevant ca

### Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_ A verifier configured with WithTransparencyLog(N>1) or WithSignedCertificateTimestamps(N>1) expected defense-in-depth against the compromise of a single log instance. However, threshold counting counted verified witnesses per-entry or per-validation-path rather than per-log-authority. As a result, a single compromised transparency l

### Summary The restrictions on redirect URLs in `openrun` can be bypassed by attackers, leading to open redirect attacks. ### Details In the current project, the referrer header value is used for subsequent redirects, so there is currently a validation for this redirect value. The current validation logic requires that the host and schema of the redirect URL be the same as the current website's

## Summary Two related authorization gaps let a host that should no longer be trusted obtain a fresh, valid Nebula certificate, because nebula-mgmt does not re-evaluate revocation/authorization state at certificate *issuance* time — only at poll time. ## 1. Blocklist not enforced at sign / re-enroll time `internal/api/enroll.go:128` calls `caMgr.Sign(...)` without consulting the blocklist. The

# Unauthenticated Cross-Origin Plugin Upload Leads to RCE (Joro ≤ v1.1.0) **Severity:** Critical **CVSS v3.1:** 9.6 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H) **Affected versions:** Joro ≤ v1.1.0, proxy mode (default), Linux/macOS **Reporter:** cstover **Date:** 2026-05-27 --- ## Summary Joro's default proxy mode (in versions <= 1.1.0) exposes a local API on `127.0.0.1:9090` that performs no authen

## Summary Nuclio controller builds a `curl` invocation string for each cron trigger and stores it as the `args` of a Kubernetes CronJob container (`/bin/sh`, `-c`, ``). Two fields in the trigger specification flow into this string without adequate sanitization: - `event.headers` keys — interpolated verbatim inside double-quoted `--header` arguments (`lazy.go:2150`); any key containing `"` break

### Summary `zalando/skipper`'s OpenPolicyAgent integration silently bypasses request-body inspection on HTTP/1.1 `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` and HTTP/2 requests that omit the `content-length` pseudo-header. When the `opaAuthorizeRequestWithBody` filter is configured, the `OpenPolicyAgentInstance.ExtractHttpBodyOptionally` helper produces an empty `raw_body` for any request whose `Content-Length

## Summary From **v1.13.2** through **v1.18.0**, oasdiff did not enforce `--allow-external-refs=false` (library: `openapi3.Loader.IsExternalRefsAllowed = false`) when loading a spec from a **git revision** (the `rev:path` form, e.g. `main:openapi.yaml`). External `$ref`s were resolved on that load path even when external refs were explicitly disabled, so the mitigation silently did not apply ther

### Summary `pkg/scalers/postgresql_scaler.go` builds libpq-style connection strings by concatenating `key=value` pairs separated by spaces. Each tenant-controllable field (`host`, `port`, `userName`, `dbName`, `sslmode`) is passed through `escapePostgreConnectionParameter`: ```go func escapePostgreConnectionParameter(str string) string { if !strings.Contains(str, " ") { return str

> [ Click here to jump to the Simplified Chinese version (点击跳转到简体中文版本)](#goploy-系统任意文件读取) # Goploy System Arbitrary File Read Vulnerability ## Basic Information - **Vulnerability Name**: Goploy Endpoints Arbitrary File Read via Path Traversal - **Vulnerability Type**: Path Traversal (CWE-22) / Arbitrary File Read - **Affected Product**: Goploy - **Severity Level**: High (CVSS V3 7.7) - **Known Af

### Summary `Project.AddFile`, `Project.EditFile`, `Project.RemoveFile`, and `Project.Edit` in `cmd/server/api/project/handler.go` accept a project or project-file row id from the JSON body and act on it without checking that the project belongs to the caller's namespace. The corresponding `model.ProjectFile.GetData` and `model.Project.GetData` queries filter only by row id. A user holding the `m

## Summary Authenticated Kite users with any role can request `/api/v1/overview` for a cluster that their roles do not permit by selecting that cluster with `x-cluster-name`. The overview route is registered before `middleware.RBACMiddleware()` and `GetOverview` only checks `len(user.Roles) > 0`, so it returns aggregate Kubernetes inventory and capacity data from unauthorized clusters. The issue

### Summary Domain names were written to the log without first being validated to contain allowed characters. ### Impact Depends on how the logs were used.

### Summary When an entry was removed from the LRU cache, a pointer to the removed element was not properly cleaned up. ### Impact A local attacker can get netfoil to use more memory. By default this is limited to 100MB via systemd, which would trigger service restarts when reached.

### Summary Potential bypass of domain name filter by crafting a DNS request with multiple questions, with the first question being legitimate. ### Impact Depends on a local attackers ability to craft multiple questions and the remote DoH server supporting them.

### Summary `agentConn.apiClient()` used the default redirect behavior of `http.Client` while its custom transport dialed the host from the request URL as long as the port was the workspace agent HTTP API port (`4`). Agent tailnet IPs are deterministic from agent UUIDs, so a malicious workspace agent could return a redirect to another agent's tailnet IP and cause the control-plane client to send

### Summary Coder's subdomain-based workspace app proxy allowed the same-owner CORS check to be bypassed. When a workspace-name subdomain segment parsed as a UUID, the workspace was resolved by ID without confirming the URL's username matched the real owner, while the CORS middleware trusted the unverified username in the hostname. > **Note:** Practical exploitation requires subdomain app routin

### Summary The `AgentLogLine` dashboard component instantiated `ansi-to-html` without `escapeXML: true` and inserted the result via `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` so HTML embedded in workspace agent log lines was rendered as live markup. Server-side sanitization did not neutralize HTML metacharacters. > **Note:** Exploitation requires a victim to view attacker-controlled agent logs in the dashboard.

### Summary The AI Bridge Proxy (`aibridgeproxyd`) created a goproxy server whose default transport set `InsecureSkipVerify: true` and only assigned a secure transport when an upstream proxy was configured. In the default configuration (no upstream proxy), outbound HTTPS to the Coder access URL accepted any TLS certificate. > **Note:** Practical exploitation requires an on-path (man-in-the-middl

### Summary AI Bridge proxy endpoints authenticate via `Server.IsAuthorized` in `coderd/aibridgedserver`, which validates key format, expiry, secret and deleted or system users but does not check whether the account is suspended. Because suspension does not revoke existing API keys, a suspended user's unexpired token keeps working. > **Note:** Practical impact is limited to already-issued API ke

### Summary AI Bridge provider handlers read request bodies with `io.ReadAll` without a maximum size so an authenticated user with AI Bridge access could send an arbitrarily large body and exhaust memory. > **Note:** Exploitation requires authenticated access to the AI Bridge endpoints and the impact is limited to availability (denial of service). ### Impact An authenticated member-level user

### Summary The devcontainer recreate endpoint relied on route middleware that checked only `ActionRead` on the workspace and, unlike the sibling delete endpoint, performed no `ActionUpdate` check before triggering the destructive rebuild. > **Note:** Exploitation requires an existing low-privilege role with access to the target workspace. ### Impact Any authenticated principal with read-only

### Summary The `CreateSubAgent` RPC did not validate a requested app sharing level against the template's `MaxPortSharingLevel` before persisting workspace apps, letting a workspace owner exceed the administrator's configured maximum. > **Note:** Exploitation requires the ability to register sub-agent apps in a workspace the attacker controls. ### Impact A workspace owner with an agent token

### Summary `coder open app` opens external workspace-app URLs without validating the scheme or host. When an external app URL contains the `$SESSION_TOKEN` placeholder the CLI replaces it with the user's real session token before handing the URL to the OS open handler. > **Note:** Practical exploitation requires the victim to run `coder open app` against a workspace whose external app definitio

### Summary `POST /api/v2/files` converts zip uploads to tar in memory via `CreateTarFromZip`, which enforced a per-entry size limit but no aggregate limit on total decompressed output, writing to an unbounded in-memory buffer. > **Note:** Exploitation requires authenticated file-upload access and the impact is limited to availability (denial of service). ### Impact An authenticated user could

### Summary The workspace app proxy resolves the target app from `httpapi.RequestHost()` which prefers the `X-Forwarded-Host` header over the real `Host` header. No middleware strips `X-Forwarded-Host` before routing and the header is not browser-forbidden so client-side JavaScript can set it on `fetch()` calls. > **Note:** Practical exploitation requires subdomain app routing (wildcard hostname

### Summary The tailnet coordinator validates that an agent's `Addresses` derive from its authenticated UUID but applies no equivalent check to `AllowedIPs`. The coordinator forwards agent-supplied `AllowedIPs` verbatim to tunnel peers which install them into the WireGuard peer configuration. ### Impact A malicious workspace agent can advertise arbitrary `AllowedIPs` prefixes including another

### Summary `UpsertWorkspaceApp` overwrites an existing app's `agent_id` on a primary-key conflict and `insertAgentApp` accepts the app ID from the provisioner's `CompleteJob` payload without verifying it belongs to the workspace being built. `CompleteJob` runs under `dbauthz.AsProvisionerd` so the authorization layer does not block the cross-workspace upsert. > **Note:** Exploitation requires e

### Summary `NewDataBuilder` in `provisionersdk/proto/dataupload.go` allocated a byte slice using the client-supplied `FileSize` from a `DataUpload` message without an upper-bound check. Although the DRPC wire limit is 4 MiB, the `FileSize` value itself was unconstrained ### Impact An authenticated user able to reach the provisioner daemon serve endpoint could send a roughly 50-byte message dec

### Summary `coder config-ssh` wrote server-supplied SSH settings (`HostnameSuffix`, `SSHConfigOptions`) into the user's `~/.ssh/config` without sanitizing embedded newlines or restricting directives so a malicious or compromised Coder server could inject arbitrary SSH configuration. > **Note:** Practical exploitation requires control of the server-supplied values through a malicious or compromi

### Summary The `PUT /api/v2/users/{user}/password` endpoint authorized only `ActionUpdatePersonal` and did not prevent a `user-admin` from resetting an `owner` account's password. It also did not require the current password when an admin reset another user's password. > **Note:** Exploitation requires the privileged `user-admin` role so practical risk is limited to deployments that grant `user

### Summary Two flaws in Coder's OIDC login chained into account takeover: email-based user matching fell back to linking by email without checking for an existing link to a different IdP subject and the `email_verified` claim was only enforced when present as a boolean `false` so an absent or non-boolean claim was treated as verified. ### Impact An attacker who could authenticate at the config

### Summary Coder's OIDC callback checked `email_verified` with a direct Go `bool` type assertion. When an IdP returned the claim as a non-boolean (for example the string `"false"`) or omitted it, the assertion failed open and the email was treated as verified. Combined with an unconditional email-based account fallback, this enabled account takeover. ### Impact An attacker who registered a vic

### Impact Users with the ability to create CiliumLocalRedirectPolicies can specify arbitrary ClusterIPs via addressMatcher, which enables hijacking traffic to Services in any namespace, bypassing the namespace-scoping guarantees enforced by serviceMatcher. In addition, deleting such a policy can corrupt Cilium's internal service state, causing service translation to stop working entirely for th

### Summary The `helmet` middleware in gofiber/fiber never sets the `Strict-Transport-Security` (HSTS) response header, even when `HSTSMaxAge` is explicitly configured, because the condition check at `helmet.go:67` uses `c.Protocol()` — which returns the HTTP protocol version string (e.g., `"HTTP/1.1"`, `"HTTP/2.0"`) — instead of `c.Scheme()` — which returns the URL scheme (`"http"` or `"https"`)

## Summary The Dragonfly **scheduler**'s v1 gRPC service contains an unauthenticated Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). When a peer reports a successful download of a TINY task, the scheduler calls `Peer.DownloadTinyFile()` and issues an HTTP `GET` to a host and port taken verbatim from the attacker-controlled `PeerHost.Ip` / `PeerHost.DownPort` fields of the gRPC request body. The HTTP client u

The TIFF decoder does not place a limit on the size of PackBits-compressed data. A maliciously-crafted image can exploit this to cause a small image (both in terms of pixel width/height and encoded size) to make the decoder decode large amounts of compressed data.

### Summary Algernon selects its file handler from `filepath.Ext()` (engine/handlers.go:134), which does not treat the NTFS-equivalent names `x.lua::$DATA`, `x.lua.`, or `x.lua ` as `.lua`. On Windows, an unauthenticated client appends one of these suffixes to any server-side script on a public path and receives its raw source instead of executed output, leaking embedded secrets such as database

# Share-link `?token=…` redemption races past download limit **Ecosystem:** Go **Package:** `goshs.de/goshs/v2` (`github.com/patrickhener/goshs`) **Affected:** ` 0 || entry.DownloadLimit == -1 { // ...serve file... // = current.DownloadLimit { delete(fs.SharedLinks, token) } fs.sharedLinksMu.Unlock() ``` Between line 978 (`RUnlock`) and line 1008 (`Lock`), any number

# WebDAV listener ignores `--read-only`, `--upload-only`, and `--no-delete` mode flags **Ecosystem:** Go **Package:** `goshs.de/goshs/v2` (`github.com/patrickhener/goshs`) **Affected:** ` /tmp/r/x.txt goshs -p 18000 -wp 18001 -w -ro -d /tmp/r -b admin:pw & curl -u admin:pw -X PUT http://localhost:18000/y.txt --data x # 403 (HTTP enforces -ro) curl -u admin:pw -X PUT http://localhost:180

# ORAS Go forwards registry credentials across registry redirects Reporter / public credit: JUNYI LIU ## Summary ORAS Go can forward registry credentials configured for one registry origin to a different HTTP origin during registry redirects. There are two related paths: 1. A manifest or metadata request authenticates to the origin registry, then the origin returns a redirect to another host

### Root cause The tar-extraction helper `ensureLinkPath` at [`content/file/utils.go:262-275`](https://github.com/oras-project/oras-go/blob/main/content/file/utils.go#L262-L275) validates that a hardlink's target resolves inside the extract base, but then returns the original unresolved `target` string back to the caller: ```go func ensureLinkPath(baseAbs, baseRel, link, target string) (string,

The file content store in `oras-go` attempts to confine writes to `workingDir` when `AllowPathTraversalOnWrite=false`, but the guard is lexical and does not account for symlink traversal. If `workingDir` contains a symlink path component and an attacker-controlled blob title (via `ocispec.AnnotationTitle`) targets a path under that symlink, `pushFile()` can create a file outside `workingDir`. ##

## Summary oras-go follows a registry-controlled `Location` header during the monolithic blob upload flow and reuses the `Authorization` header from the initial `POST` request for the subsequent `PUT` request. If a malicious registry returns a cross-host `Location`, oras-go can send the caller's credentials to an attacker-controlled endpoint. ## Affected Versions tested: v2.6.0 (commit 03243809

## Summary oras-go's `auth.Client` follows the `realm` URL from a registry's `WWW-Authenticate: Bearer` challenge without validating its scheme or host. The `realm` field is server-controlled by design in the OCI/distribution spec — registries legitimately point token requests at a separate auth endpoint (e.g. Docker Hub's `registry-1.docker.io` -> `auth.docker.io`), so cross-host realms on publi

### Impact A vulnerability has been identified in Rancher Manager that allows users assigned the Project Owner role to modify Pod Security Admission (PSA) labels on namespaces within their projects. Under the default role configuration, an attacker with the following access pattern can exploit this issue: 1. **Cluster Access:** The user is granted Cluster Member access. 2. **Project Ownership:**

### Summary The fix for GHSA-fpxj-m5q8-fphw (CVE-2026-45710, "Mailpit: Set a default 50MB p/m limit to prevent DoS via unlimited SMTP DATA and /api/v1/send body sizes") wrapped only `POST /api/v1/send` with `http.MaxBytesReader`. The four other Mailpit JSON-body API endpoints `PUT /api/v1/messages` (SetReadStatus), `DELETE /api/v1/messages` (DeleteMessages), `PUT /api/v1/tags` (SetMessageTags),

### Impact A vulnerability has been identified within Rancher Manager in the GitHub App authentication provider. When evaluating permissions, the provider incorrectly expands user team memberships to include all teams within the associated GitHub organization, rather than restricting access to the specific teams to which the user actually belongs. Specifically, when a user authenticates via the

### Impact A vulnerability in Fleet for Rancher Manager affects multi-tenancy environments where different tenants share the same downstream clusters (e.g., different privileged or untrusted teams inside the same organization). On unpatched versions, tenants could bypass restrictions to access any config map or secret across all namespaces on the downstream cluster. They can create cluster-wide

### Impact A vulnerability has been identified in Fleet when the `helmRepoURLRegex` field isn't set on a `GitRepo` resource. Fleet's bundle reader forwards Helm authentication credentials (`BasicAuth`) to any URL specified in the `helm.repo` field of a `fleet.yaml` file. An attacker with git push access to a Fleet-monitored repository can exploit this behavior by specifying a malicious URL in `he

### Impact A critical command injection vulnerability has been identified in the Rancher Manager cluster import endpoint `/v3/import/{token}_{clusterId}.yaml` through unsanitized YAML parameters. This endpoint accepts an `authImage` query parameter that is rendered without sanitization into a generated Kubernetes manifest template. By including URL-encoded newlines in the parameter value, an atta

### Impact A vulnerability has been identified in Fleet when the webhook endpoint is configured without a secret; an attacker can forge webhook requests. The attacker doesn't need to know the specific repository or path configured in the GitRepo resource to make Fleet process these requests. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability to cause the following impacts: 1. Trigger continuous repositor

### Impact A vulnerability has been identified in Fleet's agent-side deployer, which did not filter security-sensitive keys from `namespaceLabels` in `fleet.yaml` (or `BundleDeployment.spec.options.namespaceLabels`) when applying them to the target namespace. An attacker with `git push` access to a Fleet-monitored repository could overwrite Pod Security Standards (PSS) enforcement labels on a ta

#### Summary Centrifugo's dynamic JWKS endpoint feature can verify a JWT for one allowed issuer using a public key cached from another allowed issuer. The JWKS cache and `singleflight` lookup are keyed only by the JWT header `kid`, not by the resolved JWKS endpoint, issuer, audience, or other trust-domain namespace. In a documented multi-issuer dynamic JWKS configuration, an attacker who can obt

### Impact An unauthenticated remote attacker can trigger unbounded memory growth on the timestamp authority server. This vulnerability exists because the global `wrapMetrics` middleware records the raw HTTP request path (`r.URL.Path`) and raw HTTP request method (`r.Method`) as Prometheus labels for latency and request count metric vectors. Since this middleware runs before standard routing occ

## Impact Three security vulnerabilities were identified in the OIDC Discovery client: 1. **Blind Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via Cross-Host Redirects**: Fulcio uses an HTTP client to fetch OIDC discovery metadata (`/.well-known/openid-configuration`). Prior to this fix, if a configured issuer returned an HTTP redirect to a different host, the client followed it by default. This allowe

### Impact Probo's `saferedirect` package validates redirect URLs used across authentication flows (OIDC, SAML, session transfer, OAuth connectors, and trust-center magic links). The validator only inspected the second character of relative paths, so a URL like `/../\evil.com` passed validation because the second character is `.`. Go's `http.Redirect` normalizes this path to `/\evil.com` before se

### Summary A follow-up bypass of the round-4 PodSpec hardening (GHSA-gx55-f84r-v3r7, GHSA-wmgg-3p4h-48x7, GHSA-v455-mv2v-5g92). Those advisories validate and sanitize the `PodSpec` (`spec.runtime.podSpec` / `spec.builder.podSpec` / `function.spec.podSpec`), but the Environment CRD also exposes `spec.runtime.container` and `spec.builder.container` — a standalone `Container` merged into the runtim

### Summary Fission builder pods were created with `ServiceAccountName: fission-builder` and no `AutomountServiceAccountToken: false`, so the kubelet auto-mounted the service-account token into every container in the pod — including the user-supplied builder image. ### Details The user controls the builder container image, command, and podspec through `Environment.spec.builder.image` / `.contai

### Summary Fission's `Environment` CRD exposes `spec.runtime.podSpec` and `spec.builder.podSpec`, which are merged into the Kubernetes pod specs for runtime and builder pods. The merge logic propagated `hostNetwork`, `hostPID`, `hostIPC`, container `privileged`, and `serviceAccountName` from the user-supplied podspec with no filtering, and `Environment.Validate` performed no security-relevant c

### Summary Fission's Container Executor path lets a tenant supply `Function.spec.podspec` directly; the executor merges it into the executor-built podspec and creates a Deployment whose pods run the user's container image. ### Details Two flaws compounded: 1. `pkg/apis/core/v1/validation.go::FunctionSpec.Validate` only checked that `spec.PodSpec != nil` when `executorType: container`; it did

### Summary A stronger framing of the same root cause as GHSA-gx55-f84r-v3r7: the `Environment.spec.runtime.podSpec` / `spec.builder.podSpec` passthrough lacked validation, and `MergePodSpec` propagated dangerous fields into the generated pods. ### Details Three independent flaws compounded: 1. **Validate gap.** `pkg/apis/core/v1/validation.go::Environment.Validate` checked only container nami

### Summary The Fission Function admission webhook (`pkg/webhook/function.go`) validated that `spec.secrets[].namespace` and `spec.configmaps[].namespace` equalled the function's own namespace but performed no equivalent check on `spec.environment.namespace`. ### Details An attacker with permission to create Functions in their own namespace could set `spec.environment.namespace` to any other te

### Summary A Fission Function spec carries three reference types — Secret, ConfigMap, and Package. The first two were namespace-validated by the admission webhook; `PackageRef.Namespace` was not. ### Details A tenant with `functions.fission.io/create` in their own namespace could set `spec.package.packageref.namespace` to any other namespace. When the function is invoked, the fetcher sidecar r

### Summary A low-privilege developer who could create a `KubernetesWatchTrigger` (KWT) in their own namespace was able to establish a persistent surveillance channel over any other namespace. ### Details Two independent flaws compounded: 1. `pkg/kubewatcher/kubewatcher.go::createKubernetesWatch` used `w.Spec.Namespace` (user-controlled) directly as the Watch target without checking it against

### Summary Fission's `buildermgr` controller processed `Package` CRDs without verifying that `Package.spec.environment.namespace` matched `Package.metadata.namespace`. ### Details An attacker with `packages.fission.io/create` in their own namespace could set `spec.environment.namespace` to any other tenant's namespace. The controller then used its high-privilege service account to fetch the En

### Summary The Fission MessageQueueTrigger (MQT) scaler controller exposed two privilege-escalation primitives to any subject able to create MQTs in a namespace. ### Details **1. Secret materialization.** `getEnvVarlist` in `pkg/mqtrigger/scalermanager.go` read the Secret named in `Spec.Secret` using the controller's cluster-wide `secrets/get` RBAC and emitted each key as a literal `EnvVar.Val

## Summary The `checkUserPassword` GraphQL query in Dgraph is vulnerable to DQL (Dgraph Query Language) injection. User-supplied password values are interpolated directly into a DQL `checkpwd()` query via `fmt.Sprintf` without any escaping or parameterization. An attacker can inject a password containing a double-quote character to break out of the DQL string literal and append arbitrary DQL quer

### Summary The `GET /api/v1/ddns` and `GET /api/v1/notification` endpoints return full resource objects including plaintext third-party API credentials — Cloudflare API tokens, TencentCloud SecretKeys, Slack/Discord/Telegram webhook URLs with embedded bot tokens, and Authorization header values — without any field-level redaction. Any authenticated admin who calls these endpoints receives every

## Summary In gonic, the Subsonic API endpoints `/rest/deletePlaylist.view` and `/rest/getPlaylist.view` perform no per-resource authorization. Once authenticated as *any* user (admin or not), an attacker can: 1. **Delete any playlist owned by any other user** (including admin) by passing its `id`. 2. **Read the full contents** (name, comment, song list) of any other user's **private** (non-publ

## Summary The maintainer's recent fix in [`6dd71e6a3c966867ef8c900d359a7df75789f410`](https://github.com/sentriz/gonic/commit/6dd71e6) (`fix(subsonic): enforce playlist ownership on getPlaylist/deletePlaylist`) added an ownership check based on `playlist.UserID`. However, `playlist.UserID` is derived from the *first path segment* of the attacker-controlled playlist ID, with no path containment o

## Summary A logic error in `ServeCreateOrUpdatePlaylist` allows **any authenticated Subsonic user** (including non-admin) to write playlist M3U content to an attacker-controlled absolute filesystem path on the gonic host, and to create intermediate directories with `0o777` permissions. The bug is independent of the playlist ownership IDOR fixed in [`6dd71e6`](https://github.com/sentriz/gonic/co

## 1. Description The `getRedirectURL` function in `oauth2.go:22-29` constructs the OAuth2 callback URL by concatenating the request's `Host` header with a fixed path, with **zero validation** of the Host header: ```go func getRedirectURL(c *gin.Context) string { scheme := "http://" referer := c.Request.Referer() if forwardedProto := c.Request.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto"); forward

## 1. Description The Nezha dashboard exposes two endpoints that create long-lived WebSocket streams to monitored agents: - `POST /api/v1/terminal` → `createTerminal()` (terminal.go:27-67) - `POST /api/v1/file` → `createFM()` (fm.go:28-67) Both call `rpc.NezhaHandlerSingleton.CreateStream(streamId, ...)` which inserts a new `ioStreamContext` into an **unbounded** `map[string]*ioStreamContext` (

### Summary `fallbackToFrontend` in the dashboard's `NoRoute` handler treats any URL whose **raw string** starts with `/dashboard` as an admin-frontend asset request. The check uses `strings.HasPrefix`, not a path-segment match, so the input `/dashboard../data/config.yaml` is accepted; `strings.TrimPrefix` leaves `../data/config.yaml`; and `path.Join("admin-dist", "../data/config.yaml")` normalize

## Summary `PATCH /server/{id}` accepts and persists nonexistent `ddns_profiles` IDs for a member-owned server. If another user later creates a DDNS profile with one of those IDs, the DDNS worker resolves the stored ID and dispatches an update using the other user's DDNS profile configuration in the context of the attacker's server. This is a second-order authorization bypass: direct binding to

### Summary An authenticated non-admin user who owns any server can create or update a NAT profile whose `domain` is equal to the dashboard's own HTTP Host (for example, `dashboard.example:8008`). The dashboard's top-level HTTP/gRPC multiplexer checks `NATShared.GetNATConfigByDomain(r.Host)` before dispatching requests to the dashboard API, frontend, or gRPC handler, so a member-controlled NAT pro

Credentials for a registry may be inadvertently leaked to external servers. A prerequisite for this attack is a malicious registry server, a malicious blob store, or a registry that does not restrict the external URLs for foreign blobs. ## Example attack A malicious registry serves an OCI image manifest containing a layer descriptor with a `urls` field pointing to an attacker controlled host: `

### Impact **CVSSv4 Baseline Score:** Low 2.4 **CVSSv4 Weighted Score:** Low 1.3 The full CVSSv4 Vector for this vulnerability is: > CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:H/IR:L/AR:L/MAV:N/MAC:H/MAT:P/MPR:L/MVC:L/MVI:N/MVA:N/MSC:L/MSI:N/MSA:N/S:N/AU:Y/R:U/V:D/RE:L/U:Amber **CVSSv3.1 Baseline Score:** Low 3.1 **CVSSv3.1 Overall Score:** Low 3.4 The full CVSSv

### Summary In nezha **v1.14.13–v1.14.14** and **v2.0.0–v2.0.9**, the WebSocket endpoints `GET /ws/terminal/:id` and `GET /ws/file/:id` authenticate the caller only by the presence of a valid stream UUID, with no ownership check tying that UUID to the user who created the stream. Any authenticated dashboard user (including a `RoleMember`) who learns a live stream UUID can attach to the session an

Blnk API key endpoints had an authorization issue that allowed non-master API keys to perform key-management actions outside their intended authorization boundary. In affected versions, API key operations trusted caller-controlled request values for owner and scope decisions. As a result, a non-master API key could potentially manage keys for another owner by supplying a different owner value, or

Previously, CVE-2024-45337 fixed an authorization bypass for misused ssh server configurations; if any other type of callback is passed other than public key, then the source-address validation would be skipped.