Beyond End-to-End Recovery: Towards a Better Understanding of LLM Steganography via Rolewise Decomposition
In large language model (LLM) steganography, an encoder hides a private message in an otherwise ordinary response, as te
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← 返回所有主题In large language model (LLM) steganography, an encoder hides a private message in an otherwise ordinary response, as te
Modern LLM agents can retrieve information from accessible documents, and then disclose a sensitive conclusion assembled
Perimeter triage faces a latency/semantics trade-off: signature engines are fast and format-safe but blind to unseen att
Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems face security, privacy, and copyright risks including content leakage, sour
Current LLM safety benchmarks predominantly rely on binary safe or unsafe labels, lacking explanatory depth and sufferin
The widespread adoption of generative artificial intelligence in recent years has brought a parallel rise in prompt inje
We introduce CALLIOPE, a top-down framework for discovering topic hierarchies in large corpora of unstructured data (e.g
Agentic AI extends large language models (LLMs) from generating responses to planning and executing complex workflows, s
Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly use persistent memory to personalize responses, and personal attributes i
LLMs increasingly operate over mixed-sensitivity contexts, where they must reason over information ranging from public t
Large language models are deployed globally, yet safety alignment and evaluation remain concentrated in English: harmful
Personalized large language models (LLMs) increasingly rely on profile-conditioned inference, pairing public requests wi
Phone scams impose substantial and growing costs on individuals and financial systems worldwide, yet existing countermea
Attack success rate (ASR) evaluates jailbreaks against large language models without accounting for repeated calls to th
As jailbreak attacks against large language models (LLMs) become increasingly diverse, red-teaming has come to rely on l
A guardrail classifier is reported as if unsafe were a property of text. It is not: it is a property of a policy, and th
Prompt injection is the dominant security risk for large-language-model (LLM) applications and agents, yet the field sti
LLM code agents increasingly ship code with little oversight, yet defenders trained on static vulnerability datasets fal
Can one sentence manipulate an agent's belief by targeting a single implicit warrant linking evidence to a conclusion? I
Jailbreak papers report an attack success rate, the share of responses that deliver the harmful request, and read it as