Trim: Fee Level Matters More Than Skew in Lightning Routing
Lightning routing nodes lend their channel balance for a posted fee. Operators' tools move that fee with the balance aro
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共收录 54 条相关情报。
← 返回所有主题Temporal Liquidity Crossing for Blockchains: An EIP-1559 Extension for Admission Below the Base Fee
Transactions differ in how their value changes with execution time and relative position. Ethereum's EIP-1559 lets them
Game of Phones: Harnessing Game Theory and LLMs in 'Bot Wars' to Counteract Phone Scams
Phone scams impose substantial and growing costs on individuals and financial systems worldwide, yet existing countermea
StratFL: Countering Covert Model Poisoning Attacks with Strategic Federated Learning
Advanced persistent threats (APTs) are a major concern in federated learning (FL) deployments in critical sectors such a
Digital-Twin-Referenced Belief-Guided Q-Learning for Jammer Identification and Beam-Power Control in a mmWave Model
Digital Twin (DT) combined with reinforcement learning (RL) can support adaptive resource allocation and security-aware
The False Allure of "Security by Obscurity": A Game-Theoretic Approach
"Security by obscurity," or the idea that hiding how a system works helps protect it from adversaries, has long been poo
Moving Target Defense in SDN-enabled EV Charging Network
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is emerging as a promis- ing technology for EV Charging infrastructure (EVCI) since it
Host Attack Graph for Botnet Propagation
Botnets represent the backbone of most modern cybersecurity attacks through which botmasters deploy distributed denial o
The Economic Security of Exponential EIP-1559
We consider the problem of parameter selection for EIP-1559, a widely used gas pricing mechanism for blockchains. As opp
When One Leak Pays Forever: Context Binding and the Price of Deterring Collusion
本文研究阈值加密内存池（threshold-encrypted mempool，当前对抗 MEV 抢跑的主要防御手段之一）中解密委员会的合谋威慑问题。核心洞察是：一次泄露往往能反复获利——当解密委员会中达到法定人数（例如 n 名成员中的任意
From Reconnaissance to Response: Quantitative Risk Parameterization and Game Theoretic Containment in Modern Enterprise Attack
论文聚焦现代企业安全运营中心（SOC）面临的响应延迟问题：人工处置滞后使攻击者得以在杀伤链的早期侦察阶段持续推进。作者指出，经典博弈论防御模型虽然能优化防御资源的战略分配，但其效用矩阵是静态的，无法随实时遥测数据自适应调整。为此，论文提出一
How Much Must a Private Mempool Hide? Exact Leakage Thresholds for Sandwich Attacks
本文研究私有/加密内存池（private mempool）在对抗三明治攻击（sandwich attack）与 MEV 提取时的隐私边界问题。现实中，私有内存池很少隐藏全部信息：交易对（pair）、交易方向、以及交易规模的粗略区间往往仍会泄
Too Late to Slash: Coordinating a Risk-Free Equivocation Attack
该论文针对权益证明（PoS）区块链中「罚没（slashing）」机制的经济安全性假设提出质疑，并给出形式化的博弈论反驳。传统观点认为：在没有罚没的情况下，验证者可以无成本地发起模棱两可（equivocation，即对同一高度签署相互冲突的区
Credible AUctions via MPC Gadgets: Bounding Information Leakage Under Abort
本文研究“可信拍卖”(credible auction) 的设计问题：一个以最大化自身收益为目标的拍卖方，如何被机制本身约束而不偏离协议。当拍卖方可以控制影子出价者(shill bidders) 时，可信性面临根本性的密码学障碍。直观的解决
Epsilon-Nash Equilibria in History-Dependent SA-MDPs
该论文研究状态对抗马尔可夫决策过程（SA-MDP），并将其建模为一场针对观测空间攻击的博弈：智能体每一步根据接收到的观测选择动作，而对手知道智能体所处的真实状态，并在一个依赖状态的邻近集合内选择一个被扰动的观测。已有工作主要聚焦马尔可夫策略
A Bayesian Correlated Equilibrium for Early Insider-Threat Detection
该论文提出一种基于贝叶斯博弈论的内部威胁早期检测机制。研究者将内部威胁检测建模为动态贝叶斯博弈，其中平台协调一个由多个战略认证者组成的委员会，在诚实用户之间维持均衡，并在数据外泄之前检测恶意偏离行为。认证者与用户在一个称为贝叶斯时间相关均衡
Networked Multi-Resource Defense Capabilities in a General Lotto Game
本论文研究复杂系统安全中的多类型防御资源分配问题。在网络安全中，防御者通常拥有多种异构防御资产（如防火墙、入侵检测系统、蜜罐等），需要针对不同类型的攻击（如DDoS、恶意软件、钓鱼等）进行最优部署。作者将这一问题建模为一般Lotto博弈（G
Optimal Adversarial Testing: Extracting Honest Test Results from Dishonest Test Takers
该论文研究在测试结果可能被不诚实测试者恶意扭曲的情况下，如何设计最优测试策略以恢复真实测试结果。现实中的考试、评估等场景常面临作弊或对抗性行为，随着AI技术发展，利用AI作弊的现象愈发普遍和严重，导致测试结果的可靠性受到威胁。作者将测试问题
Rules Before Oracles: Auditable, User-Configurable Argument Selection for Deliberative Polling
本文研究审议性民意调查（deliberative poll）中参数选择机制的可审计性问题。当提交的论证数量超出任何个人的阅读能力时，必须有一种机制决定每个选民看到哪些论点，这一过程实际上掌握了大部分决策权。现有实践常常依赖不透明的学习型排名
Rational Dolev--Yao Attackers: Decidable Incentive-Aware Verification of Security Protocols in Strategic Logic
本文提出“理性 Dolev-Yao 攻击者”模型，将传统符号化协议验证中的 Dolev-Yao 入侵者扩展为具有成本与收益考量的理性主体。传统 DY 入侵者在知识允许范围内执行所有可能动作，不论是否有利于达成目标；而真实对手会最大化效用，仅