When a process calls execve(2) to execute a setuid or setgid image, hwpmc(4) is supposed to detach PMCs owned by unprivileged processes. An inverted check meant that this scenario was not handled properly. An unprivileged local user who has attached PMCs to a process can continue monitoring it after the process executes a setuid or setgid binary, contrary to the intended policy.

An Ubuntu-specific patch to AccountsService before 23.13.9-8ubuntu7 only partially drops privileges before launching language helper scripts. It changes the effective UID/GID to the target user but leaves the real UID as 0 (root). A shell spawned by a helper script inherits ruid=0 and may reset its effective UID to root, enabling local privilege escalation.

As an inadvertent side effect of an unrelated code change, PRIV_KTRACE was always denied to a jailed root user. Tracing configured by a jailed root user was therefore not flagged as privileged. An unprivileged user in a jail that has permission to debug the target process can modify the jailed root user's ktrace(2) flags, or disable tracing outright. A jailed root user therefore cannot reliably

The kernel function that implements unlinkat(2) and funlinkat(2) validated the AT_RESOLVE_BENEATH flag but failed to pass it through to the underlying path lookup. The flag was silently dropped, so path resolution was not actually restricted. A process that uses AT_RESOLVE_BENEATH with unlinkat(2) or funlinkat(2) to confine path resolution can in fact resolve paths above the starting directory.

sh provides Python process launching. Prior to 2.2.4, the _uid option in sh.py performs an incomplete privilege drop on Linux and Unix-like systems. When sh runs from an elevated process and launches a command with _uid set to an unprivileged user, the child changes its UID but can retain the parent process's supplementary groups because the privilege-drop sequence does not fully establish the tar

### Impact The `_uid` option performed an incomplete privilege drop on Linux/Unix-like systems. When `sh` was run from a process with elevated privileges, such as root, and a command was launched with `_uid=`, the child process changed its UID and primary GID but did not reset its supplementary groups. As a result, the child process could retain the parent process’s supplementary groups, potentia

PraisonAI before 4.6.78 contains an unenforced security policy vulnerability in the default Subprocess Sandbox backend where blocked_commands, blocked_paths, blocked_imports, allow_subprocess, and allow_file_write restrictions are completely ignored. Attackers can execute arbitrary subprocess commands, read sensitive files, and perform destructive operations despite explicit security policy config

PraisonAI before 4.6.78 contains an unenforced security policy vulnerability in the default Subprocess Sandbox backend where blocked_commands, blocked_paths, blocked_imports, allow_subprocess, and allow_file_write restrictions are completely ignored. Attackers can execute arbitrary subprocess commands, read sensitive files, and perform destructive operations despite explicit security policy config

The id utility in uutils coreutils miscalculates the groups= section of its output. The implementation uses a user's real GID instead of their effective GID to compute the group list, leading to potentially divergent output compared to GNU coreutils. Because many scripts and automated processes rely on the output of id to make security-critical access-control or permission decisions, this discrepa

In onNullBinding of HostEmulationManager.java, there is a possible way to launch an activity from the background due to a logic error in the code. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is needed for exploitation.

Authentication modules in Netatalk 1.5.0 through 4.4.2 fail to check the return value of seteuid(), which may allow a remote authenticated attacker to retain elevated privileges under error conditions.