Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in wojtekmach Req allows attacker-controlled HTTP servers to exhaust memory in a Req client via decompression-bomb response bodies. Req's default response pipeline includes Req.Steps.decode_body/1 and Req.Steps.decompress_body/1 in lib/req/steps.ex. decode_body/1 dispatches on the server-supplied content-type (or URL e

Protocol::HTTP2 versions through 1.12 for Perl is vulnerable to a HTTP/2 Bomb. Protocol::HTTP2's inbound HPACK path has no header-list size limit, so a small HTTP/2 request can expand into large server memory (the "HTTP/2 bomb"). The headers_decode method materialises a full key+value copy per indexed reference with no running size check, and the stream_header_block_add method appends (since ver

Protocol::HTTP2 versions through 1.12 for Perl is vulnerable to a HTTP/2 Bomb. Protocol::HTTP2's inbound HPACK path has no header-list size limit, so a small HTTP/2 request can expand into large server memory (the "HTTP/2 bomb"). The headers_decode method materialises a full key+value copy per indexed reference with no running size check, and the stream_header_block_add method appends (since ver

### Impact The METS-GBS backend's XML parsing and the input document format detection lacked security controls, enabling: - XML External Entity (XXE) attacks to read local files or cause denial of service - Decompression bombs (zip bombs) to exhaust memory and disk space - Unbounded archive extraction consuming system resources An attacker could craft malicious METS-GBS archives that, when proces

Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in elixir-tesla tesla allows a denial of service via decompression bomb in HTTP response bodies. When Tesla.Middleware.DecompressResponse or Tesla.Middleware.Compression is included in a Tesla middleware pipeline, HTTP response bodies are decompressed eagerly with no size limit. The decompress_body/2 function in lib/te

Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Prior to 1.7.17, a remote, unauthenticated denial-of-service vulnerability in Batch.Decompress (data/batch/batch.go) allows any peer that participates in a topic served by MultiDataInterceptor to allocate multi-gigabyte heaps on the receiving node from a sub-50 KiB gossip payload. A single packet is sufficient to OOM-kill a vali

The LAPI router uses `gin-contrib/gzip` with `DefaultDecompressHandle` globally (`pkg/apiserver/controllers/controller.go`). This middleware decompresses incoming request bodies without enforcing a maximum decompressed size. The endpoints `/v1/watchers` or `/v1/watchers/login` require no authentication. An attacker can send small gzip-compressed JSON payloads that, when decompressed, result in h

Versions of the package exifreader before 4.39.0 are vulnerable to Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) due to decompressing PNG zTXt metadata without enforcing a built-in maximum decompressed output size. When asynchronous parsing is enabled, a crafted PNG file containing a highly compressed zTXt chunk can cause ExifReader to materialize a disproportionately large Comm

Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in ninenines cowlib allows unauthenticated remote denial of service via memory exhaustion. cow_spdy:inflate/2 in cowlib passes peer-supplied compressed bytes directly to zlib:inflate/2 with no output size bound. The SPDY header compression dictionary (?ZDICT) is public, and zlib compresses long runs of repeated bytes a

Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in ninenines cowlib allows unauthenticated remote denial of service via memory exhaustion. cow_spdy:inflate/2 in cowlib passes peer-supplied compressed bytes directly to zlib:inflate/2 with no output size bound. The SPDY header compression dictionary (?ZDICT) is public, and zlib compresses long runs of repeated bytes a

urllib3 is an HTTP client library for Python. From 2.6.0 to before 2.7.0, urllib3 could decompress the whole response instead of the requested portion (1) during the second HTTPResponse.read(amt=N) call when the response was decompressed using the official Brotli library or (2) when HTTPResponse.drain_conn() was called after the response had been read and decompressed partially (compression algori

## Summary A remote, unauthenticated denial-of-service vulnerability in `Batch.Decompress` (`data/batch/batch.go`) allows any peer that participates in a topic served by `MultiDataInterceptor` to allocate multi-gigabyte heaps on the receiving node from a sub-50 KiB gossip payload. A single packet is sufficient to OOM-kill a validator with conventional memory provisioning. Fleet-wide application a

Audiobookshelf is a self-hosted audiobook and podcast server. Prior to 2.32.2, the POST /api/backups/upload endpoint decompresses the details entry from an uploaded .audiobookshelf ZIP file entirely into memory using zip.entryData(), with no limit on the decompressed size. The upload middleware also has no file size limit. An admin user can upload a crafted ZIP containing a highly compressed detai